

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**A MILITARY STRATEGY FOR CENTRAL ASIA**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Jon E. Chicky  
United States Army

Professor Stephen J. Blank  
Project Advisor

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE <b>03 MAY 2004</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>A Military Strategy for Central Asia</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) <b>Jon Chicky</b>				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT <b>See attached file.</b>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>36</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			



## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Jon E. Chicky

TITLE: A Military Strategy For Central Asia

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 19 March 2004      PAGES: 38      CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

After 11 September 2001, Central Asia rose from relative strategic obscurity to major importance as the United States began to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Central Asia is geographically critical to the GWOT with basing and over-flight access for U.S. and coalition forces conducting Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan, as well as for NATO forces participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul.

The region's weak and poorly developed state institutions make some of the Central Asian states – if not all of them – potentially ripe for domestic instability and external antagonisms. Since gaining their independence in 1991, Central Asian nations have witnessed a bloody civil war in Tajikistan, insurgent activity in the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan, and assassination attempts on the Turkmen and Uzbek presidents. The region has become a nexus of increased political, military, economic, and religious interest and activities of regional and external powers.

Given renewed U.S. interest in Central Asia, the nation requires a military strategy for the region. This paper will propose such a strategy after examining several issues relating to the development of such a strategy. What U.S. interests are at stake in Central Asia? What objectives(s) (ends) should the United States pursue, given the complex strategic environment in and around Central Asia? What methodologies or concepts (ways) should the nation employ in using the military instrument of power to achieve these ends and with what resources (means)? Finally, what are the risks facing the U.S. in implementing this strategy?



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
LIST OF TABLES .....	vii
A MILITARY STRATEGY FOR CENTRAL ASIA.....	1
<b>U.S. NATIONAL VALUES AND INTERESTS</b> .....	2
<b>SUMMARY OF STRATEGIC APPRAISAL</b> .....	5
<b>CURRENT U.S. POLICY VISION FOR CENTRAL ASIA</b> .....	5
<b>PROPOSED MILITARY STRATEGY</b> .....	6
VITAL INTEREST – WAR ON TERRORISM.....	6
IMPORTANT INTEREST – NON-PROLIFERATION OF WMD MATERIALS.....	8
IMPORTANT INTEREST – TRANSPARENT DEVELOPMENT OF CASPIAN ENERGY.....	9
IMPORTANT INTEREST – GLOBAL INTEGRATION OF CENTRAL ASIA.....	10
IMPORTANT INTEREST – ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF DRUGS, PEOPLE, AND SMALL ARMS.....	12
<b>RISK ASSESSMENT</b> .....	13
<b>CONCLUSION</b> .....	15
ENDNOTES.....	17
GLOSSARY.....	21
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	23



## LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1. U.S. Interests in Central Asia and their intensity.....	3
TABLE 2. Summary of Strategic Appraisal.....	5
TABLE 3. U.S. Interests and Military Objectives Crosswalk .....	9
TABLE 4. Values-Interests-Military Objectives-Risks.....	19





## A MILITARY STRATEGY FOR CENTRAL ASIA



FIGURE 1. MAP OF CENTRAL ASIA<sup>1</sup>

After 11 September 2001, Central Asia rose from relative strategic obscurity to major importance as the United States commenced its Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).<sup>2</sup> Central Asia's main importance in the GWOT is its geographic location – providing basing and over-flight access for U.S. and coalition forces conducting Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan. Additionally, some Central Asian states are providing basing access for NATO units serving in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. However, weak and poorly developed state institutions make Central Asia potentially ripe for domestic instability and external threats. Since gaining independence in 1991, Central Asia has seen a bloody civil war in Tajikistan, insurgent activity in the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan, and apparent assassination attempts on the Turkmen and Uzbek presidents. Increasingly, the region has become a nexus of political, military, economic, and religious interest and intrigue from regional and external powers.

This renewed and intense U.S. interest in Central Asia calls for a regional military strategy. The purpose of this strategy is to describe how the military instrument of power should support U.S. regional interests. This paper will propose a military strategy for Central Asia after examining several issues related to the development of such a strategy. What are the U.S. and other nations' interests in Central Asia? What military objectives (ends) should the United States pursue, given the region's complex strategic environment? What methodologies or concepts (ways) should the nation employ its military instrument of power to achieve these

ends, and with what resources (means)? Finally, what are the risks facing the nation as it implements this strategy?

This paper begins with an examination of U.S. national values and interests for the region. A summary of the major powers' and regional states' interests toward Central Asia then follows. The paper then reviews the current U.S. strategic vision for the region. Finally, it suggests appropriate military objectives, strategic concepts, and resources to support this recommended regional military strategy. The paper concludes with an assessment of risk in implementing this strategy.

## **U.S. NATIONAL VALUES AND INTERESTS**

The nation's values and interests are the cornerstone upon which our government bases good public policies and strategies. *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (NSS) distills the nation's values into four broad concepts: *liberty, justice, peace, and prosperity*. Liberty includes the hallmarks of political and economic freedom, human rights, and a free society. Justice is achieved through the rule of law, due process, and respect for women's rights. The NSS finally advocates peaceful relations among states and seeks to secure nations from external threats, especially terrorism.<sup>3</sup>

National interests are relative, but they provide direction for U.S. policies and strategies; national values provide a constant 'watermark' upon which our interests, policies, and strategies are based. The U.S. national interests for Central Asia have evolved over time since 1991. Indeed, current U.S. interests in the region reflect the new post-9/11 security environment. Through analysis of various policy statements of senior State Department officials, U.S. national interests for Central Asia are:

- War on Terrorism
- Non-proliferation of materials for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
- Transparent and secure development of Caspian energy reserves
- Integration of Central Asia into the world community, including political (democratic pluralism) and economic reform and institution of the rule of law
- Respect for human rights
- Reduction and elimination of trafficking in narcotics, persons, and small arms<sup>4</sup>

Effective strategy depends on judicious prioritization of national interests. The greatest resources are allocated, to those assigned the highest priority.<sup>5</sup> This analysis uses three levels of intensity to prioritize U.S. interests in the region: vital, important, and peripheral. If a vital interest is unfulfilled, it will have immediate consequence for national security. If an important

interest is unfulfilled, it will result in damage that will eventually affect national security.

Peripheral interests are those interests if unfilled, will result in damage that is unlikely to affect national security.<sup>6</sup> Table 1 depicts this paper's U.S. national interests for Central Asia for the mid- to long-term.

Intensity Interest	War on Terrorism	Non-Prolif of WMD materials	Caspian Energy	Global Integration (pol/econ)	Human Rights	Illicit Trafficking
<b>Vital</b>	<b>x</b>					
<b>Important</b>		<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>x</b>
<b>Peripheral</b>						

TABLE 1. U.S. INTERESTS FOR CENTRAL ASIA AND THEIR LEVELS OF INTENSITY

The War on Terrorism is the only *vital* national interest at stake in Central Asia. Securing the nation and its allies and partners from global terrorism is currently the single most important U.S. security interest. The United States has deployed troops and aircraft to the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan to support the Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan. Committing U.S. forces to the region clearly indicates how vital the war on terrorism interest is in Central Asia. Central Asia is vital not only to our operations in Afghanistan to eliminate terrorists of global reach but also to ensure that the region itself does not become a sanctuary for terrorists. This interest is enduring, since the GWOT will be a generational struggle.

The non-proliferation of WMD and materials for these weapons is obviously an *important* interest. The United States does not want rogue states or terrorists to gain access to the residue of the former Soviet WMD infrastructure in Central Asia. Many research facilities and other institutions still contain fissile materials as well as chemical and biological substances of former Soviet WMD programs. Finally, many former WMD scientists, researchers, and specialists in the region could offer their scientific services to the highest bidder. Although the perceived threat of WMD proliferation was the *casus belli* for the 2003 Iraq War, the WMD situation in Central Asia is not nearly as critical. The United States has already done much to lessen the threat of WMD proliferation in and from Central Asia since the early 1990s. However, much work remains to be done; therefore, this is a long-term national interest.

The security and the transparent development of Caspian energy ranks as an *important* U.S. interest. United States involvement in Caspian energy began in earnest under the Clinton Administration. The Administration fully supported pipeline proposals that avoided Iran and reduced Russia's influence in transporting Caspian energy to markets. The goal of U.S.

Caspian energy policy is to enhance global energy security, bolster the independence of Caspian energy producing states, and deepen the integration of countries along the pipeline routes into the global economy.<sup>7</sup> Caspian energy development is thus a long-term U.S. interest.

Integration of Central Asia into the global political and economic system, which requires political (including democratic) and economic reforms and the institution of the rule of law, is another *important* U.S. interest. It is important not only because it reflects core U.S. values, but it also contributes to regional security and supports the global war on terrorism. A stronger regional economy with corresponding political pluralism and better governance will enhance regional security and reduce the region's vulnerability to extremism. Without reforms and the rule of law, the post-Soviet regimes may become breeding grounds for future extremism by spawning generations of young, angry Muslims. However, U.S. public policy statements regarding Central Asia have not required the regional states to become democracies overnight but rather to encourage political pluralism and democratic reforms.<sup>8</sup> Thus, the expectation is that democracy will require some time to take hold in Central Asia, but it is not a prerequisite for U.S. assistance and support. This is long-term interest serves as the bedrock of U.S. policies in Central Asia.

Human rights are another *important* interest that occupies much attention in the U.S. relationship with Central Asia and reflects core values. Respect for human rights by the ruling elite enhances the overall security of a country as it would engender greater popular support of the government. This interest attracts the attention of the Congress, international organizations, and the very vocal human rights groups. Congress is increasingly tying the release of security assistance funds to Central Asian states' human rights behavior. Therefore, this interest will remain a constant for the United States.

The reducing and then eliminating illicit trafficking is the final *important* interest for the United States. Concerns about trafficked persons (primarily women and children), drug smuggling, and trafficking of small arms/light weapons do not directly threaten or affect the well-being of the U.S. or its interests in the region. However, the specter of terrorism elevates illicit trafficking as an *important* interest. Over the long term, trafficking in persons, small arms, and drugs erodes the states' institutions from within. More importantly, trafficking has both a direct and indirect relationship to international terrorism. Additionally, the trafficking of humans violates the U.S. values of individual liberty and justice.

## SUMMARY OF STRATEGIC APPRAISAL

Table 2 summarizes the various interests and concerns of the major powers and neighboring states regarding Central Asia. A brief analysis indicates that all parties have common interests in economic relations and Caspian energy. Moreover, all the countries listed below have interests in controlling narcotics trafficking. Most have interests in security issues, especially in countering or preventing terrorism, strengthening border controls, and illicit drug trafficking. Russia, China, and Iran share concerns over the post-9/11 U.S. military presence in the region. Finally, the United States is clearly the only country that is concerned about human rights in Central Asia. It is necessary to understand and appreciate the interests of the other major powers and neighboring states when developing the regional strategy. This analysis will assist in determining possible risks and points of friction for recommended military strategy.

Interest	RU	CH	AF	PK	IN	IR	TU	US
Country								
Counterterrorism/Security	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓
Caspian Energy	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Trade/Economic Ties	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Religious/Ethnic Concerns	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		
Border & Boundary Issues	✓	✓				✓		✓
Drug Trafficking	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Human Rights								✓
Concerns over U.S. Presence	✓	✓				✓		

TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF STRATEGIC APPRAISAL<sup>9</sup>

## CURRENT U.S. POLICY VISION FOR CENTRAL ASIA

The U.S. foreign policy vision for Central Asia incorporates the interests and national values discussed previously. Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, Ambassador Elizabeth Jones, articulated the U.S. vision for Central Asia as: "... [the Central Asian states will] remain independent and become democratic, stable, and prosperous partners of the United States who respect human rights, are increasingly integrated into the global economy, and avoid the poverty, isolation, and intolerance that breed terrorism and fundamentalism."<sup>10</sup> Ambassador Jones also declared that the U.S. will implement this vision through long-term engagement in Central Asia. The paragraphs below will propose a military strategy to secure the nation's Central Asian interests and to implement this policy vision.

## PROPOSED MILITARY STRATEGY

This proposed military strategy provides military objectives (ends) for each of the U.S. regional interests in Central Asia, concepts (ways) to implement the objectives coupled with brief descriptions of some the resources (means) required. The military objective for the global integration interest incorporates human rights concerns. Table 3 illustrates the crosswalk between the U.S. regional interests and military objectives.

Interests	Military Objectives
War on Terrorism	Sustain GWOT in Central Asia/Afghanistan
	Improve indigenous CT capabilities
Transparent/secure development of Caspian Energy	Enhance Caspian littoral security
Non-Proliferation of WMD Materials	Remove the residue of WMD and prevent WMD smuggling
Pol/Econ Global Integration of Central Asia (includes democratic & free markets reforms)	Develop professional militaries while increasing their interoperability with US/NATO forces
	Increase regional military cooperation
Human Rights	<i>included in Develop professional militaries</i>
Reduction/elimination of Illicit Trafficking	Improve border security

TABLE 3. U.S. INTERESTS AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES CROSSWALK

### VITAL INTEREST – WAR ON TERRORISM

*Objective - Sustain GWOT in Central Asia/Afghanistan.* The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) continues Operation *Enduring Freedom* (OEF) in Afghanistan with both combat and logistics support from Central Asian bases until the President of the United States terminates the mission. Afterwards, USCENTCOM conducts stability and security cooperation operations in Central Asia and Afghanistan, as future bi-lateral agreements or international resolutions may require, to prevent renewed al-Qaeda activities in the region.

*Concepts and Resources.* United States maintains access to airfields in Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic to sustain combat and logistics support to U.S. stability operations in Afghanistan until completion of OEF. This objective requires close host nation coordination for ongoing operations as well for future access agreements. The Department of Defense should obtain funding for base upgrades, repairs, and renovations to cover wear and tear of airfields from U.S./Coalition operations and prepare for post-OEF regional posture requirements, if necessary. Department of State (DOS) continues to sustain air over-flight agreements with all the Central Asian states and “gas and go” refueling agreements with those states selected by United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and USCENTCOM.

Beyond OEF, the United States should maintain a “warm base”<sup>11</sup> in Central Asia, assuming approval from a Central Asian government. A Central Asian “warm base” would meet the global military posture concepts found in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.<sup>12</sup> This Central Asian warm base would provide temporary access for ground and air units, on a rotational basis, to

conduct security cooperation activities in Afghanistan and Central Asia.<sup>13</sup> Uzbekistan, due to its central position in Central Asia, its relatively independent policies regarding Russia and China, and the fact that U.S. forces are already there, is the first choice for this warm base. Geographic alternatives to Uzbekistan are Tajikistan and Turkmenistan due to their proximity to Afghanistan. These two nations have significant political and security risks that make them less attractive, in the near-term, than Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan, however, has major human rights, political and economic reform issues (see the Risk Assessment for further discussion). Another possible alternative to Uzbekistan is Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. Coinciding with a Central Asian government's approval for a warm base, expand and improve the installation's runway to accept large body civil transport aircraft.

U.S. forces operating from this warm base would include, but are not limited to, Special Operations Forces (SOF), multi-purpose fighter aircraft, inter- and intra-theater airlift, combat search and rescue, and logistics to support both the base infrastructure and the U.S. forces in operating Afghanistan and Central Asia. The United States should obtain agreements to quickly deploy to and employ forces from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan should a regional emergency require their need. All airfields included in future access agreements should be C-17 capable as a minimum. Access agreements should provide the United States as much strategic and operational freedom of action to conduct short- and even no-notice offensive counterterrorist actions against global terrorist targets.

*Objective - Improve indigenous CT capabilities.* The United States, through USCENTCOM, strengthens internal Central Asian military capabilities to dissuade, diminish, deter, and, when necessary, defeat terrorist and/or insurgent activities **with links to al Qaeda** to support the Global War on Terrorism<sup>14</sup>.

*Concepts and Resources.* This objective supports U.S. security cooperation partners in the region and serves as an economy of force operation in the GWOT by supporting local forces to effectively engage terrorists/insurgents with local or regional reach. The United States uses SOF, Army Light Infantry, or Marine Corps Infantry, and even private contractors through rotational unit deployments, Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)(SOF only), and USCENTCOM sponsored exercises to conduct Foreign Internal Defense (FID) activities. Doctrinally, FID comprises of three mission categories – indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), and combat operations.<sup>15</sup> This strategy calls for the use of all three categories of FID to achieve this objective. FID activities in Central Asia will be part of an integrated interagency Internal Development and Defense



program for countries that have internal security threats. Proposed countries for FID activities are the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as all three have had past problems with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Moreover, all three countries have the internal ingredients that make them susceptible for Islamist or other types of political extremism. Units conducting FID will train, equip, and advise indigenous CT and border security forces of these countries. Border security forces are part of the Central Asian national defense establishments and are the first line of defense for the Central Asian states. Enhancing border security forces in detecting and interdicting terrorists also creates synergies in interdicting drug and small arms smuggling as well as movement of WMD substances. The CT forces of the Ministries of Defense would conduct operations against terrorists once they have penetrated the border regions.

FID activities will utilize both Title 10, DOD funds for operations and maintenance, and Title 22, DOS funds for security assistance training funds,<sup>16</sup> unless Congress approves special legislation creating a funding source that makes no funding and legal distinction between training (Title 22) and advising/operations (Title 10). Advising host nation CT forces on operational missions falls under the combat operations category of FID. As such, this activity will require presidential approval. The United States should leverage when and where possible assistance from the United Kingdom, Turkey, and other countries who have the capability to conduct CT training and advising and who are politically acceptable to the Central Asian and the U.S. governments.

As these are the only military objectives tied to a vital Central Asian interest for the United States, these two objectives have priority for all resources in implementing this regional strategy.

#### IMPORTANT INTEREST - NON-PROLIFERATION OF WMD MATERIALS

*Objective - Remove the residue of Soviet WMD and prevent WMD smuggling.* The United States removes lethal residue of Soviet nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons production and testing in Central Asia to prevent these substances from proliferating to rogue regimes or terrorist groups.

*Concepts and Resources.* Through cooperative efforts with all the Central Asian states, the Department of Defense, primarily through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), works to eliminate the residue of former Soviet nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons testing, storage, and production sites. DTRA has already completed much in this arena.<sup>17</sup> DTRA is to work with research facilities and other institutions removing the remaining small and potentially

dangerous amounts of WMD materials. Furthermore, DOD must work to ensure hostile forces do not entice former WMD researchers and research institutions to put their expertise at use for these threat entities.

Another line of effort for this objective is to strengthen border security. Border inspections of persons and vehicles transiting through the Central Asian states and strengthening border cooperation decrease the likelihood of these materials proliferating to rogue states or terrorist groups. Strengthening the border checkpoints and other border surveillance aspects supports most of the other U.S. interests for Central Asia. DTRA is the main DOD effort in the WMD materials border monitoring and inspection aspects. DTRA activities in border security should be integrated in the overall U.S. effort with the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security with USCENTCOM security cooperation activities. U.S. SOF has a special role in counter-proliferation aspects that Secretary of Defense and CDR, USCENTCOM must consider if *in extremis* circumstances warrant.<sup>18</sup>

#### IMPORTANT INTEREST – TRANSPARENT DEVELOPMENT OF CASPIAN ENERGY

*Objective - Enhance Caspian littoral security.* The United States Government through United States European Command (USEUCOM) and USCENTCOM enhances Caspian littoral states' capabilities to secure their hydrocarbon critical nodes and lines of communication (land and sea) from hostile acts and to interdict transnational threats that use the Caspian Sea as transport link between Asia and Europe.

*Concepts and Resources.* There are several methods to achieve this objective. These include bilateral and multilateral Caspian littoral energy security exercises, equipping and training, and advising Kazakh and Turkmen coastal security forces, and engendering regional cooperation in hydrocarbon industrial security. This objective will be an integrated activity between USEUCOM and USCENTCOM. USEUCOM's proposed *Caspian Guard* initiative serves as the basis for this integration. The *Caspian Guard* concept consists of three intersecting and mutually reinforcing program elements: integrated airspace and maritime surveillance and control systems, integrated national C4I, and reaction and response forces.<sup>19</sup> Currently, this program focuses on Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. The purpose is to "synergize all our priorities for the Caspian under one roof" and to address a range of key, common security issues – non-proliferation, counterterrorism, illicit trafficking, defense of key economic zones, and provisions for indications and warning.<sup>20</sup> Thus, *Caspian Guard* would create synergies within activities under the War on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation of WMD materials, and Illicit trafficking national interests.

Beyond the three target countries of *Caspian Guard*, multilateral activities should include Turkmenistan at the level that is appropriate considering the pariah state nature of the Turkmen regime. Continued (albeit at a low-level) security cooperation with the Turkmen defense establishment would show junior and mid-grade Turkmen officers the U.S. commitment to a future Turkmenistan, beyond the Niyazov dictatorship. Similarly, Russia should have opportunities to participate as required in multilateral activities in the Caspian for transparency and confidence building purposes. Iran's involvement, however, is problematic due to its lack agreement on Caspian delimitation, the fact that much of the illicit activity transiting the Caspian comes through Iran,<sup>21</sup> and Iran's inclusion in President Bush's axis of evil.

Concerning resources to implement this concept, Naval SOF, the United States Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Air Force Europe, U.S. Air Force Central Command, DTRA, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency would be some of forces required to implement this objective. Exercises on the Caspian Sea and along the littorals, coordinated through USEUCOM and USCENTCOM, would include air, land, and maritime forces of the U.S. and the littoral states as well other interested parties – Turkey, United Kingdom, or Germany to name a few.

#### IMPORTANT INTEREST – GLOBAL INTEGRATION OF CENTRAL ASIA

*Objective - Develop professional militaries while increasing their interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces.* The United States cooperates with regional states to assist them in creating professional militaries that support the rule of law and civilian control over the military. Inherent in this objective is the militaries' respect for citizens' rights and civilian control of the military. Throughout this process, the United States provides assistance to these militaries to improve their interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces.

*Concepts and Resources.* This is a long-term effort whose results regional strategists and policymakers cannot easily assess with quantifiable measures of effectiveness. There are various methodologies to achieve this objective. First, there are Professional Military Education (PME) courses in the United States or MTTs to the region funded through the International Military and Education Training (IMET) for military officers and Expanded-IMET (E-IMET) for civilian leaders, or through Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants. Second, regional representatives may attend USEUCOM Regional Security Center, the George C. Marshall Center. Another method is through the USCENTCOM's annual Program of Military Contacts (or Mil-to-Mil Plan). This program includes exchanges and visits with service academies, service officer and non-commissioned officer PME centers and academies, and other Defense and

service agencies like the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS). The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) is another excellent way to demonstrate the functioning of civil-military relations. Finally, high-level visits and meetings between Commander, USCENTCOM, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense and senior Central Asian military and civilian leaders can reinforce the message of officer and non-commissioned officer professionalization and supporting the rule of law and civilian control of the military.

All of the Central Asian states need increased professionalization as the regional militaries are legacies of the Soviet conscript force. U.S. military personnel can support the establishment of a professional NCO corps by assisting local NCO training institutions with instructor MTTs and providing training programs of instruction, etc. A second-order effect of U.S. exercises, training, and advising is that quite often U.S. NCOs lead these activities thus leaving a positive impression upon the Central Asian military leadership on the role of the NCO. This objective can obtain synergies from SOF training of regional CT forces who the Central Asians consider their elite units. U.S. SOF NCO instructors working with regional special units would assist in professionalizing these units in terms of officer-NCO-enlisted roles and responsibilities, reinforcement of the rule of law, and embedded human rights training in a FID program of instruction.

Through educating, training, advising, and equipping, U.S. forces can increase regional interoperability with U.S. and other NATO member units. The focus is not necessarily to create specialized units trained and equipped according to U.S. Tables of Organization and Equipment. Rather to improve and increase interoperability through staff and planning procedures, CT tactics and techniques, and peacekeeping procedures through exercises, training, and equipment purchases. This would then mitigate interoperability issues during FID missions or when Central Asian units serve in NATO or U.S. - led coalition military operations.

The United States should work with NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program to determine areas that both complement and supplement U.S. bilateral activities for this objective. PfP aims and goals in this objective are congruent with those of the United States. The objective is to harmonize DOD activities with those of NATO PfP to make these efforts more effective, complementary, and less redundant.

SOF is the force of choice in the small unit arena but Army or Marine infantry are options as well. The U.S. Army is the service of choice for NCO training as it has much experience in foreign NCO training programs, though again the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) is also an option. The USMC officer PME process would serve as the best example as the regional militaries are small like the USMC; further, Marine Corps Base Quantico has all USMC officer life cycle

functions at one location. If OPTEMPO issues prevent use of active or reserve forces, several civilian companies specialize in officer and NCO training through retired military contractors.

*Objective - Increase regional military cooperation.* USCENCOM works with the Central Asian states to engender and then sustain multi-lateral military cooperation for regional security confidence building and action against transnational threats.

*Concepts and Resources.* USCENCOM reestablishes its REGIONAL COOPERATION (RC) exercise program to initiate the process of regional militaries working together to resolve transnational threats. The scope of the REGIONAL COOPERATION exercises requires change from traditional peacekeeping to include counterterrorism and border and energy infrastructure security. Central Asians typically have been hesitant to cooperate regionally; therefore, senior U.S. military and civilian leaders must raise the necessity of the regional military cooperation at every opportunity in their discussions with Central Asian leaders. Furthermore, they should explain that funding for other military activities may hinge upon participation in the regional cooperation events. USCENCOM and OSD should seek out synergies with the PfP exercise program in which the Central Asian states participate and encourage NATO to conduct PfP exercises in Central Asia as well.

Another line of effort in regional cooperation is through response to natural or man-made disasters and consequence management. All of the Central Asian states have para-military organizations to respond to such occurrences organized in the ministries of emergency situations. These ministries are part of the Central Asian defense establishments and are analogous to having the Federal Emergency Management Agency and a state national guard in one organization. Moreover, defense ministry units support the ministries of emergency situations in crises (and vice versa). Multilateral regional symposia, exercises, and training offer other methods to engender and encourage regional militaries and defense establishments to cooperate with one another and develop regional interoperability as well as trust and confidence building. USCENCOM's International Workshop on Emergency Response (IWER) is an excellent platform from which to widen and deepen regional cooperation.

#### IMPORTANT INTEREST – ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF DRUGS, PEOPLE, AND SMALL ARMS

*Objective- Improve Central Asian border security.* USCENCOM improves the Central Asian border security forces as part of an interagency comprehensive effort to secure borders as the first line of defense against transnational threats including drugs, terrorists, WMD materials, small arms, and the illegal trafficking of persons and migration.

*Concepts and Resources.* This objective may be achieved through increasing regional military cooperation, removing the residue of Soviet WMD, and enhancing counterterrorism. USCENTCOM improves the Central Asian border security forces, which are part of the Central Asian defense establishments, through JCETs, MTTs, and exercises with border guard units. These activities will have an air, land, and waterborne aspects to them as appropriate. The focus of these activities is to increase border guard capabilities in detection, response, and interception of persons entering the countries illegally. Small unit operations in patrolling, sensor installment, and quick reaction are the main effort in support of this objective. The training and exercises will complement and supplement purchases of equipment – radios, remote sensors and repeaters, vehicles, riverine and coastal patrol boats, advance avionics and night vision equipment for helicopters, long range night vision devices for ground border units, etc., – to further improve border guard capabilities. Furthermore, border troops will participate in the officer and NCO professionalization programs detailed above. Forces to conduct these activities would include SOF, Army Light Infantry (active and National Guard), USMC infantry, and the U.S. Coast Guard. OSD should coordinate USCENTCOM and DTRA activities and work with DOS and the Department of Homeland Security to synergize interagency border security programs and activities.

## **RISK ASSESSMENT**

For the purposes of analysis, this paper will only examine political-military risks of this recommend strategy. Given the strategic appraisal summary, it is necessary to consider the second- and third-order effects, in achieving our military objectives, on the regional and neighboring powers. Additionally, domestic U.S. politics and values are also driving forces for the political-military risk assessment.

There are three major risks for this military strategy: Russian, Chinese, and Iranian perceptions and reactions; Congressional concerns over human rights in some Central Asian countries, specifically Uzbekistan; and the related perception by locals and others in the United States and international community that the United States supports non-democratic regimes to achieve military goals in the Central Asia region. The military objectives that these risks affect the most are: Sustaining the GWOT, improving indigenous CT capabilities, and enhancing Caspian littoral security.

It would be the post-OEF military presence (albeit on a rotational, non-permanent basis) in Central Asia, specifically Uzbekistan, that would create the greatest risk. As depicted in Table 2, Russia, China, and Iran are sensitive about any U.S. military presence, especially beyond

OEF. It is with Russia that this dissatisfaction could migrate to become an influencing factor in the U.S. - Russia strategic relationship. Russia has never fully accepted U.S. military presence in its strategic backyard. A U.S. presence in Central Asia beyond OEF could engender increased tensions between Russia and the United States and force the Central Asian states to choose to associate with one great power over the other. Thus Central Asia would truly find itself in another Great Game, pawns between two great powers. Russia could use the Collective Treaty Security Organization (CSTO) as a means to muscle Central Asian members to reduce their military contacts with the United States and NATO and disapprove future landing and over flight agreements. Furthermore, Russia's membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) could be put to use by involving China in supporting Russian efforts to pressure the United States out of the region.

A similar situation arises with the Caspian littoral security objective. Though this objective is to secure Caspian energy infrastructure from possible terrorist attacks as well as to intercept illegal trafficking of persons, drugs, small arms, and WMD materials, both Russia and especially Iran may see these activities to strengthen Kazakh and Azerbaijani Caspian security capabilities being done at their expense. Iran, already sensitive about its perceived sense of encirclement by the United States, would especially feel vulnerable as it has yet to come to agreement with the other Caspian littoral states on delimitation of the Caspian Sea. Iranian sponsored mischief along the southern Caspian littoral and pressure on the ostracized Turkmen government to remain obstinate in refusing Caspian delimitation are but two examples of possible Iranian expressions of displeasure of U.S. military activities to enhance Caspian littoral security.

Should the United States choose to create a Central Asian "warm base," especially in Uzbekistan due to geographical and political considerations, there will be intense scrutiny by the Congress and the international community, governmental and non-governmental, about this decision. The strategic military necessity of having Uzbekistan as a GWOT partner clashes with the reality of its lack of effort to carry out the political and economic reforms the United States also desires in Uzbekistan. These reforms are directly tied to the U.S. values of liberty, justice, and prosperity that are the foundation of U.S. Central Asian interests. Uzbekistan's human rights record is extremely poor and comes under much criticism in the international community. By establishing a limited, yet enduring military presence in Uzbekistan, there will be a perception by some in Congress, the NGO community, and more importantly, the Uzbek people, that U.S. military needs trump U.S. moral values. The view will be that United States once again supports non-democratic autocrats to sustain U.S. regional military presence and secure more oil resources as it has historically done in the Persian Gulf.

A similar risk exists for FID operations training and advising indigenous CT forces. There is a possibility that these U.S. - trained CT units could become praetorian guards to keep the non-democratic regimes in power. Another potential problem is that these CT forces could be used in domestic security roles to round up regime opponents. Finally, given the lack of regional cooperation and ongoing border disputes, there exists the possibility of border incursions by one Central Asian country into its neighbors chasing alleged terrorists. These hot pursuit operations may include U.S. trained and equipped (perhaps even advised) special units. This scenario would not engender better border security and regional cooperation which are two recommended military objectives for Central Asia. Furthermore, these tensions would play into the hands of Russia (and China) who would be endeavoring to mitigate U.S. influence in the region. Training elite forces in countries with dismal human rights records and uncompromising non-democratic governments will bring attention to U.S. motives and whether these actions are congruent with U.S. values and interests. In any case, the scenarios above would jeopardize legitimate U.S. efforts to strengthened regional abilities to counter local and regional terrorists linked to al-Qaeda.

## CONCLUSION

Values	Interests	Military Objectives	Political-Military Risks
<b>Liberty</b> <i>human rights</i> <i>pol/econ freedom</i> <i>free society</i>	Human Rights - <b><i>important</i></b>	<i>[embedded in develop professional militaries objective]</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Too much U.S. emphasis could push the Central Asians leaders closer towards the Russians and Chinese</li> </ul>
<b>Peace</b> <i>inter-state peace</i> <i>secure nations from external threats</i>	War on Terrorism - <b><i>vital</i></b>	Sustain GWOT Improve indigenous CT capability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Post-OEF U.S. military presence – Russia &amp; China</li> <li>• Congress, NGO human rights concerns</li> </ul>
	Non-Prolif of WMD - <b><i>important</i></b>	Remove residue of WMD	None
	Reduce Illicit Trafficking - <b><i>important</i></b>	Improve border security	None
<b>Justice</b> <i>rule of law</i> <i>due process</i> <i>women's rights</i>	Global pol/econ integration - <b><i>important</i></b>  <u><i>Democratic/market reforms</i></u>  <u><i>Rule of law</i></u>	Enhance regional mil cooperation ( <i>links to peace value but to global integration interest</i> )  Develop professional militaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Failure could result in failed states and repressive militaries.</li> </ul>
<b>Prosperity</b> <i>free markets/ trade</i>	Develop Caspian Energy - <b><i>important</i></b>	Enhance Caspian littoral security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Russian and Iranian reaction</li> </ul>

TABLE 4. VALUES-INTERESTS-MILITARY OBJECTIVES-RISKS CROSSWALK

This paper has provided a recommended military strategy to contribute in securing U.S. Central Asian interests and achieving the strategic vision for the region. This strategy provides



military objectives, concepts, and resources that directly link to the six U.S. national interests for Central Asia. These six interests have their origins in the national values — liberty, justice, peace, and prosperity (see Table 4). Furthermore, this paper has overlaid the strategy upon the strategic setting provided in Table 2. This overlay contributed to determining the significant political-military risks in implementing this strategy.

As stated earlier, there is only one vital national interest at stake in Central Asia – the War on Terrorism. Therefore, the two military objectives supporting this interest, *Sustain the GWOT* and *Improve indigenous counterterrorist capabilities* are the priority objectives the United States must achieve. *Sustain the GWOT* takes priority between these two objectives because of its direct and immediate nature to U.S. national security. The United States can work to attain the remaining objectives supporting important national interests concurrently while achieving the vital objectives listed above. However, given the finite number of SOF trainers and security assistance funding, it is necessary that the United States partner with its NATO allies (and others such as India) that share U.S. interests in the region. NATO's PfP program offers burden sharing opportunities for Central Asia. Ultimately, these secondary military objectives complement the priority military objectives supporting the *War on Terrorism* national interest.

Clearly, if the United States were to implement this proposed strategy, there would be domestic and international political issues with which to contend. Congressional and non-governmental groups concern over human rights and the lack of democratic and economic reforms in the region could create domestic friction in continuing U.S. military support to Central Asian militaries as part of the overall GWOT effort. This is the dilemma of the GWOT — the necessity to work with regimes that do not share U.S. values, but because of geography or the existence regionally based extremists, the United States cooperates with them to defeat terrorism.

Though regional powers and neighboring states share with the United States many of the same Central Asian interests, it is the continued presence of U.S. forces beyond Operation *Enduring Freedom* that would cause Russia, China, and Iran to re-examine U.S. intentions toward Central Asia. Already suspicious of the U.S. presence in Central Asia and Afghanistan, they would see a prolonged U.S. presence as an attempt to isolate or diminish their influence in the heart of Eurasia. Thus it is important that this strategy support diplomatic and economic strategies to achieve or secure U.S. interests in Central Asia. Moreover, the United States' Central Asia strategy must be harmonized with U.S. strategies for the major powers: Russia, China, and India.

WORD COUNT = 6,278

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> This CIA map of Central Asia and Caucasus was obtained from the University of Texas Perry-Castaneda map library. Available from <[www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/caucasus\\_cntrl\\_asia\\_pol2003.jpg](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/caucasus_cntrl_asia_pol2003.jpg)>; accessed 10 January 2004. This map is from the public domain and thus does not fall under the purview of copyright requirements.

<sup>2</sup> For this paper, Central Asia consists of the five former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan is a border state having historical, cultural, and other contacts with both Central and South Asia (Pakistan and India). Afghanistan, the Central Asian States, the Chinese regions of Xinjiang (also known as Eastern Turkistan) and Inner Mongolia, Mongolia, and the Russian regions of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan make up the region, known in contemporary scholarship, as Inner Asia.

<sup>3</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington: The White House, September 2002) 1.

<sup>4</sup> The author identified these interests by analyzing public policy pronouncements by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, A. Elizabeth Jones and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe from 2001 to 2003. Though these documents couched the interests in a variety of ways, there were constant themes found throughout. The author captured these themes in the six national interests introduced in this paper. The author did not find any prioritization of the interests into vital, important, or peripheral categories or any other prioritization construct in these public statements.

<sup>5</sup> Colonel Joseph R. Cerami and Colonel James F. Holcomb, Jr. eds., *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2001) 222.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, 223.

<sup>7</sup> See A. Elizabeth Jones, "Central Asia: Developments and the Administration's Policy," *Testimony Before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, House International Relations Committee*, 29 October 2003: available at <[www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/25798pf.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/25798pf.htm)> Internet; accessed on 28 November 2003.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> RU is Russia; CH is China; AF is Afghanistan; PK is Pakistan; IN is India; IR is Iran; and TU is Turkey. Sources used to determine the strategic appraisal are as follows: Olga Oliker, "Conflict in Central Asia and South Caucasus: Implications of Foreign Interests and Involvement," in *Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army*, ed. Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), 219.; Department of State, *Counternarcotics and Law Enforcement Country Program: Afghanistan*, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Fact Sheet, 2 May 2003: available from <[www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/fs/20121.htm](http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/fs/20121.htm)> Internet; accessed 18 September 2003.; Sergei Ivanov, *Aktual'nye Zadachi Razbitiia Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, available from <[www.redstar.ru/2003/10/11\\_10/3\\_01.html](http://www.redstar.ru/2003/10/11_10/3_01.html)> Internet; accessed 27 November 2003.; Lena Jonson, "Russia and Central Asia," in *Central Asian Security*, ed. Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 114.; A. Elizabeth Jones, "U.S.-Central

Asian Cooperation," *Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Caucasus*, 13 December 2001: available from <[www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2001/11299.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2001/11299.htm)> Internet; accessed 30 October 2003.; Aleksandr Bogatyrev, "Rossiiskii Forpost Na Tian'-Shane" *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 23 October 2003, p.1; and Maria Utyaganova, "Opening of Russian Airbase in Kyrgyzstan," *Central Asia Caucasus Institute's Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, 05 November 2003; available from <[www.cacianalyst.org/view\\_article.php?articleid=1908](http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1908)> Internet, accessed 27 November 2003.; Chien-Peng Chung, "The Defense of Xinjiang. Politics, Economics and Security in Central Asia," *Harvard International Review*, vol XXV, no.2 (Summer 2003): 58.; Pan Guang, "Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Context of International Antiterrorist Campaign," *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 21 no.3 (2003), 50.; Xing Guangcheng, "China's Foreign Policy Toward Kazakhstan," in *Thinking Strategically: The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus*, ed. Robert Legvold (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 111.; Stephen Blank, "India's Rising Profile in Central Asia," *Comparative Strategy*, 22 April-June 2003, 139.; S. Enders Wimbush, "India's Perspective," National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency, *Russia in the International System: A Conference Report*, June 1, 2001: available from <[www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/confreports\\_russiainter.html#panel3](http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/confreports_russiainter.html#panel3)> Internet, p.31; quoted in Blank, 141.; Ibragim Alibekov, *India Set To Expand Presence in Central Asia*, 3 December 2003; available from <[www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav120303\\_pr.shtml](http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav120303_pr.shtml)> Internet; accessed 7 December 2003.; Aftab Kazi, "Is the Proposed Russia-Chinese-India Pipeline Feasible," *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst* 13 January 2003; available from <[www.cacianalysts.org/view\\_article.php?articleid=378](http://www.cacianalysts.org/view_article.php?articleid=378)> Internet; accessed 13 December 2003.; Amit Baruah, "India, Tajikistan to set up JWG on counter-terrorism," *The Hindu* 15 Nov 2003: available from <[www.thehindu.com/2003/11/15/stories/200311502361100.htm](http://www.thehindu.com/2003/11/15/stories/200311502361100.htm)> Internet, accessed 10 December 2003.; S. Chandar, M. Nagate, et al, *Technical Assistance for the Feasibility Studies of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Natural Gas Pipeline Project*, Asian Development Bank December 2002: available from <[www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/REG/tar\\_stu\\_36488.pdf](http://www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/REG/tar_stu_36488.pdf)> Internet, accessed 18 Jan 2004. Sultan Akimbov, "The Conflict in Afghanistan: Conditions, Problems, and Prospects," in *Central Asia. A Gathering Storm?* ed. Boris Rumer (Armonk, NY, 2002), 77-78.; Edmund Herzig, "Iran and Central Asia," in *Central Asian Security*, ed. Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 178; F.Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey and Eurasia," *Turkish foreign policy in an age of uncertainty* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), 101.; Charles Fairbanks, et al. *Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia*. (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council of The United States and the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2001), 82.; Gareth M. Winrow, "Turkey and Central Asia," in *Central Asian Security*, ed. Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 216.

<sup>10</sup> A. Elizabeth Jones, "Central Asia: Developments and the Administration's Policy," *Testimony Before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, House International Relations Committee*, 29 October 2003; available from <[www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/25798pf.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/25798pf.htm)> Internet, accessed 28 November 2003.

<sup>11</sup> The author uses the term "warm base" to denote a base or portion of a host nation facility that is manned by a caretaker unit of mixed U.S. military and contractor personnel along with local national hires. This caretaker cadre would maintain the base/facility in such a manner so that in the event of a contingency or exercise the facility could rapidly receive, stage, and onward move men and materiel. The facility would have material handling, aircraft refueling, and troop life support equipment, etc., pre-positioned for rapid, no-notice use. A model of such

a “warm base” is Taszar Airbase in Hungary. Implicit in this “warm base” concept is the requisite bi-lateral agreements between the United States and the host nation to allow the use of host nation territory for such purposes.

<sup>12</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. (Washington: The Pentagon, 30 September 2001) 26.

<sup>13</sup> For the warm basing or lily pad concept see David Rennie, “America’s Growing Network of Bases,” London Daily Telegraph, 11 September 2003 available at <[www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Sep/2003/E20030911215888.html](http://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Sep/2003/E20030911215888.html)> Internet; accessed 12 September 2003.

<sup>14</sup> The so-called 4D strategy (defeat, deny, diminish, and defend) in combating terrorism is found in George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. (Washington: The White House, February 2003) 15.

<sup>15</sup> Indirect support FID activities include traditional security assistance, joint and multinational exercises and exchange programs. Direct support (not involving Combat Operations) FID missions include civil-military operations, civil affairs, humanitarian assistance, military civic action, and intelligence and communications sharing. U.S. combat operations as part of FID are done by direction of the President of United States and the Secretary of Defense. The primary role for U.S. military forces is to support, advise, and assist host nation forces through combat, combat support, and combat service support roles. See *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, Joint Pub 3-07.1, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 26 June 1996), I-5 to I-14.

<sup>16</sup> See U.S. Code Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Chapter 32, Foreign Assistance, Subchapter II, Military Assistance and Sales, Part II, Military Assistance, Section 23119.a.(2) available from <[www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title22/title22.htm](http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title22/title22.htm)> accessed 16 January 2004. Also see U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Appendix A, Commander’s Legal Considerations,” *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, Joint Pub 3-07.1, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 26 June 1996), A-1 to A-9. Title 22 usually applies to training for foreign militaries funded through Foreign Military Financing grants (FMF) or Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Special Operations Forces can train with foreign militaries through Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) under Title 10, Armed Forces, Subsection A-General Military Law, Part III, Training and Education, Chapter 101, Training Generally, Section 2011, Special Operations Forces: training with friendly militaries. The focus and benefit of this training is primarily for U.S. Special Operations Forces and not host nation troops.

<sup>17</sup> For more information about DTRA activities in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan see <[www.dtra.mil/ctr/ctr\\_kazakhstan.html](http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/ctr_kazakhstan.html)> and <[www.dtra.mil/ctr/ctr\\_uzbekistan.html](http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/ctr_uzbekistan.html)>.

<sup>18</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*. Joint Pub 3-05. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 April 1998), II-10.

<sup>18</sup> “Caspian Guard Concept Brief,” unclassified briefing without scripted commentary, Vaihingen, Germany, U.S. European Command, Directorate for Plans and Policy, 11 September 2003.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> See map of Current World Illicit Trafficking in *National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About The Future With Non-Governmental Experts*, available at <[www.cia.gov/nic/PDF\\_GIF\\_global/illicit\\_trafficking.gif](http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_global/illicit_trafficking.gif)> Internet; accessed 10 January 2004.

<sup>19</sup> "Caspian Guard Concept Brief," unclassified briefing without scripted commentary, Vaihingen, Germany, U.S. European Command, Directorate for Plans and Policy, 11 September 2003.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> See map of Current World Illicit Trafficking in *National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About The Future With Non-Governmental Experts*, available at <[www.cia.gov/nic/PDF\\_GIF\\_global/illicit\\_trafficking.gif](http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_global/illicit_trafficking.gif)> Internet; accessed 10 January 2004.

## GLOSSARY

CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CT	Counterterrorism
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FMF	Foreign Military Financing grant program
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JCET	Joint Combined Exchange Training
MTT	Mobile Training Teams
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OPTEMPO	Operations Tempo
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PME	Professional Military Education
RC	Regional Cooperation exercise
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SOF	Special Operations Forces
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
USPACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ahrari, M.E. and James Beal. *The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia*. McNair Paper 47. Washington: National Defense University, January 1996.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Strategic Future of Central Asia: A View from Washington." *Journal of International Affairs*, vol 56, no.2 (Spring 2003): 157-166.
- Akimbov, Sultan. "The Conflict in Afghanistan: Conditions, Problems, and Prospects." *Central Asia. A Gathering Storm?* ed. Boris Rumer, 69-113. Armonk, NY, 2002.
- Alibekov, Ibragim. *India Set To Expand Presence In Central Asia*. 3 December 2003 available from <[www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav120303\\_pr.shtml](http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav120303_pr.shtml)> Internet; accessed on 7 December 2003.
- Aneja, Atul. "India, Iran wooing Central Asia." *The Hindu* 12 October 2002 available from <[www.thehindu.com/2002/10/21/stories/2002102105831200.htm](http://www.thehindu.com/2002/10/21/stories/2002102105831200.htm)> Internet; accessed on 10 October 2003.
- Aras, Bülent and Ahmet Okumus. "Caspian Riches and Gulf Security." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* VII, no.2 (Summer/Fall 2002): 79-81.
- Bacevich, Andrew J. "Steppes to Empire." *The National Interest*, no. 68 (Summer 2002): 39-53.
- Blank, Stephen J. *Energy, Economics, and Security in Central Asia: Russia and Its Rivals*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Future of Caspian Security." *Problems of Post Communism* vol 50, no.1 (January/February 2003): 8-21.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *"The Future of Transcaspian Security."* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "India's Rising Profile in Central Asia." *Comparative Strategy* vol 22 (Apr-Jun 2003): 139-157.
- Bogatypov, Aleksandr. "Rossiiskii Forpost Na Tian'. – Shane: Kant obretaet status aviabazy KSBR." *Krasnaia Zvezda* (23 October 2003). 1.
- Boronin, Oleg. "On The Priorities of Russian Policy in Post-Soviet Central Asia." *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 21, no.3 (2003): 82-91.
- Burghart, Dan. "In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the Twenty-First Century." *European Security* vol 11, no.3 (Autumn 2002): 1-19.
- Bush, George. *National Drug Control Strategy*. Washington: The White House, February 2003.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington: The White House, September 2002.



- \_\_\_\_\_. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington: The White House, February 2003.
- "Busy Days In Dushanbe: Putin's Visit, EEC, CSTO." *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Central Asia Report* vol 3, no.16, 1 May 2003; available from <[www.rferl.org/centralasia/2003/05/16-010503.asp](http://www.rferl.org/centralasia/2003/05/16-010503.asp)> Internet accessed on 11 November 2003
- "Caspian Guard Concept Brief." Vaihingen, Germany: Directorate for Plans and Policy, U.S. European Command, 11 September 2003.
- "Caspian Sea Region," *Energy Analysis Brief*, Energy Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy August 2003: available from <[www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.html](http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.html)> Internet; accessed 14 January 2004.
- Chandar, S, Nagate, M., et al, *Technical Assistance for the Feasibility Studies of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Natural Gas Pipeline Project*, Asian Development Bank December 2002: available from <[www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/REG/tar\\_stu\\_36488.pdf](http://www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/REG/tar_stu_36488.pdf)> Internet, accessed 18 Jan 2004.
- Chung, Chien-Peng. "The Defense of Xinjiang. Politics, Economics, and Security in Central Asia." *Harvard International Review* vol XXV, no.2 (Summer 2003): 58-62.
- Clawson, Patrick. "Energy Security: The Persian Gulf and the Caspian Basin." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* VII, no.2 (Summer/Fall 2002): 35-41.
- Department of State, *Counternarcotics and Law Enforcement Country Program: Afghanistan*, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Fact Sheet, 2 May 2003: available from <[www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/fs/20121.htm](http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/fs/20121.htm)> Internet; accessed 18 September 2003
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002*, East Asia Overview, available at <[www.state.gov/documents/organization/200112.pdf](http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/200112.pdf)>; accessed 10 January 2004.
- Fairbanks, Charles. "Being There." *The National Interest*, no.68 (Summer 2002): 39-53.
- Fairbanks, Charles, S. Frederick Starr, et al. *Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia*. Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council of the United States and the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2001.
- Garnett, Sherman W. "The Strategic Challenge of Kazakhstan and Inner Asia" In *Thinking Strategically. The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus*, ed. Robert Legvold, 217- 233. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2003.
- Grifford, Bernard F. "Promoting Stability in Central Asia." *Center For Strategic Leadership Issues Paper* 6-01 (July 2001).1-4.
- Guang, Pan. "Shanghai Cooperation Organization In The Context of International Terrorist Campaign." *Central Asia and The Caucasus* 21, no.3 (2003): 48-54.

- Guangcheng, Xing. "China's Foreign Policy Toward Kazakhstan" In *Thinking Strategically. The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus*, ed. Robert Legvold, 107-140. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2003.
- Herzig, Edmund. "Iran and Central Asia" In *Central Asian Security*, ed. Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, 171-198. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.
- Holcomb, James F. "Strategic Risk" *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr., 187-202, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2001.
- Hunter, Shireen T. "Religion, Politics, and Security in Central Asia." *SAIS Review*, vol XXI, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2001); 64-89.
- Ivanov, Sergei. *Aktual'nye Zadachi Razvitiia Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii*. available from <[www.redstar.ru/2003/10/11-10/3\\_01.html](http://www.redstar.ru/2003/10/11-10/3_01.html)> Internet; accessed 27 November 2003.
- Jones, A. Elizabeth. *Central Asia: Developments and the Administration Policy* 29 October 2003 Testimony Before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia House International Relations Committee, available from <[www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/25798pf.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/25798pf.htm)> Internet; accessed 28 November 2003.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *U.S. – Central Asian Cooperation*. 13 December 2001 Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Caucasus available from <[www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2001/11299.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2001/11299.htm)> Internet; accessed 30 October 2003.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *U.S. Relations With Central Asia*. 11 February 2002 Press Briefing available from <[www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/7946pf.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/7946pf.htm)> Internet; accessed 10 October 2003.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *U.S. Engagement in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Staying Our Course Along the Silk Road*. 10 April 2002 Remarks given at the "Central Asia: Its Geopolitical Significance and Future Impact Conference, University of Montana available from <[www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/19606pf.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/19606pf.htm)> Internet; accessed 31 October 2003.
- Jonson, Lena. "Russia and Central Asia" *Central Asian Security*, ed. Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, 95-126, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Russia and Central Asia. A New Web of Relations*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998.
- Kazi, Aftab. "Is The Proposed Russia-China-India Pipeline Feasible?" *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, 13 January 2003; available from <[www.cacianalyst.org/view\\_article.php?articleid=378](http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=378)> Internet; accessed on 13 December 2003.
- Khalid, Adeeb. "A Secular Islam: Nation, State, And Religion in Uzbekistan." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35 (2003), 573-598.
- Kindalov, Vladimir and Oleg Limanov. "Russia and China in Central Asia: Geopolitical Changes." *Central Asia and The Caucasus* (21) no.3 (2003): 71-76.

- Klimenko, Anatolii. "Osobennosti integratsionnykh protsessov v Azii i ikh vliyanie na bezopasnost' v regione." *Voennyye Mysli* June 2003: 18-26
- Larrabee, F. Stephen and Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey and Eurasia" *Turkish foreign policy in an age of Uncertainty*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003.
- Legvold, Robert, ed. "Great Power Stakes in Central Asia" In *Thinking Strategically. The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus*, 1-38. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2003.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "U.S. Policy Toward Kazakhstan" In *Thinking Strategically. The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus*, 67-106. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2003.
- Lubin, Nancy, Alex Klaitis, and Igor Barsegian. *Narcotics Interdiction in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Challenges for International Assistance*. New York, NY, Open Society Institute, 2002.
- Luong, Pauline Jones. "The Middle Easternization of Central Asia." *Current History*. (October 2003); 333-340.
- Lykke, Arthur F. "Toward An Understanding Of Military Strategy." In *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr., 179-186, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2001.
- MacFarlane, Neil. "European Strategy Toward Kazakhstan." In *Thinking Strategically. The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus*, ed. Robert Legvold, 107-140. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2003.
- Malik, Hafeez, ed. *Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- Manning, Robert A. "The Myth of the Caspian Great Game and the 'New Persian Gulf'." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* VII, no.2 (Summer/Fall 2002): 15-31.
- National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About The Future With Non-Governmental Experts*, available from <[www.cia.gov/nic/PDF\\_GIF\\_global/illegal\\_trafficing.gif](http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_global/illegal_trafficing.gif)> Internet; accessed 10 January 2004.
- Naumkin, Vitaly N. "Russian Policy Toward Kazakhstan" In *Thinking Strategically. The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus*, ed. Robert Legvold, 39-66. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2003.
- Olcott, Martha Brill. "Taking Stock of Central Asia." *Journal of International Affairs* vol.56, no.2 (Spring 2003): 3-17.
- Oliker, Olga. "Conflict in Central Asia and South Caucasus: Implications for Foreign Interests and Involvement" In *Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Implications for the U.S. Army*, ed. Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna, 185-240. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003.

- Pascoe, B. Lynn. *Security, Stability, Prosperity: Engaging the Eurasian Front-Line States*. 20 September 2002 Remarks delivered at the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization available from <[www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/13639pf.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/13639pf.htm)> Internet; accessed 30 October 2003.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The U.S. Role in Central Asia." *27 June 2002 Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus* available from <[www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/11535pf.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/11535pf.htm)> Internet; accessed 30 October 2003.
- Rashid, Ahmed. *Jihad. The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*. New Haven, CN: Yale University, 2002.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The New Struggle in Central Asia. A Primer for the Baffled." *World Policy Journal* XVII, no.4 (Winter 2000/01): 33-45.
- Rennie, David. "America's Growing Network of Bases." *London Daily Telegraph*, 11 September 2003 available from <[www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Sep/2003/E20030911215888.html](http://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Sep/2003/E20030911215888.html)> Internet; accessed 12 September 2003.
- Rumer, Boris Z., ed. *Central Asia: A Gathering Storm?* Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2002.
- Rumer, Eugene B. "Flashman's Revenge: Central Asia after September 11." *Strategic Forum*, no. 195 (December 2002): 1-8.
- Rumsfeld, Donald. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington: The Pentagon, 30 September 2001.
- Saivetz, Carol R. "Caspian Geopolitics: The View from Moscow." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* VII, no.2 (Summer/Fall 2002): 53-61.
- Smith, Dianne L. *Central Asia: A New Great Game?* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996.
- Srivastava, Archana. "Dynamics of Russian-Central Asian Geopolitical Relations." *India Quarterly* vol.LVIII no.3-4 (July-December 2002): 243-272.
- Starr, S. Frederick. *The Security Environment of Central Asia*. Emirates Lecture Series no. 22. Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1999.
- Stauffer, Thomas R. "Caspian Fantasy: The Economics of Political Pipelines." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* VII, no.2 (Summer/Fall 2002): 63-78.
- U.S. Code Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Chapter 32, Foreign Assistance, Subchapter II, Military Assistance and Sales, Part II, Military Assistance, Section 23119.a.(2) available from <[www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title22/title22.htm](http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title22/title22.htm)> accessed 16 January 2004.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Appendix A, Commander's Legal Considerations", *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, Joint Pub 3-07.1, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 26 June 1996.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*. Joint Pub 3-05. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 April 1998.

Utyaganova, Maria. "Opening of Russian Airbase in Kyrgyzstan" *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst* 5 November 2003 accessed from <[www.cacianalyst.org/view\\_article.php?articleid=1908](http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1908)> Internet, accessed 27 November 2003.

"Uzbekistan keen on close defence ties with India" *The Times of India* 7 November 2003 available from <[www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll/xml/uncomp/article/show?msid+272009.htm](http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll/xml/uncomp/article/show?msid+272009.htm)> Internet; accessed 7 November 2003.

"Uzbekistan supports NATO on expanding ISAF mandate in Afghanistan." UzReport.com 9 December available from <[www.uzreport.com/En/page\\_print.cfm?news\\_id=11378](http://www.uzreport.com/En/page_print.cfm?news_id=11378)> Internet; accessed 13 December 2003.

Wimbush, S. Enders, "India's Perspective" *Russia in the International System: A Conference Report*, National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency, June 1, 2001: available from <[www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/conference\\_reports/russia\\_conf.html](http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/conference_reports/russia_conf.html)> Internet, p.31; quoted in Blank, *India's Rising Profile in Central Asia*, 141.

Winrow, Gareth M. "Turkey and Central Asia" *Central Asian Security* ed. Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, 199-218, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001

Wishnick, Elizabeth. *Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.